Nepal's Peace Process: Does Ethnic Inclusion Mean Economic Inclusion? by Ismail, Feyzi
The contents of this Development Viewpoint reflect the views 
of the author(s) and not necessarily those of CDPR or SOAS.
www. soas.ac.uk/cdpr
Telephone: +44 (0)207 898 4496
Centre for Development Policy and Research 
SOAS, University of London
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London , WC1H  0XG, UK
  School of Oriental and African Studies 
This shift in priorities has brought the Maoists some important political 
benefits: increased support from excluded communities and more 
votes. In line with this strategy, the Maoists recently declared a series of 
autonomous states across the country based on nationality, a concept 
that they contend is broader than ethnicity. Their argument is that since 
there could be no single ethnic majority in any given autonomous state, 
all ethnic minorities within each of these states should be guaranteed 
their rights. 
Other mainstream parties have also offered proposals for a new 
federalist structure, in some cases based on a mix of ethnicity and 
geographical region. The main issue now is not whether a federalist 
structure will be adopted, but what form it will take, and whether the 
Constituent Assembly can forge enough consensus to finish drafting the 
constitution, due to be completed at the end of May 2010. The interim 
constitution states that a state of emergency might be declared if the 
constitution is not completed by this deadline. 
Donor priorities
The majority of donor agencies support, either directly or indirectly, a 
federalist structure. They have also provided funding for a number of 
ethnic groups and their advocacy campaigns, particularly on the issue 
of their inclusion in the constitution. Such support has been necessary 
because of clear links between being poor and being a low caste or a 
religious or ethnic minority. For example, the poverty rates of dalits, 
Muslims and ethnic minorities range between 41% and 46%, while 
the national average is 31%. Many Nepalis believe that the drafting 
of the new constitution offers a clear opportunity to address this 
discrimination. 
However, the donors could also be accused of focusing on ethnic 
inclusion at the expense of economic inclusion. Although Nepal has seen 
positive economic growth in recent years, the vast majority of poverty 
alleviation projects undertaken by donors have been linked to small 
microcredit, trade and income-generation projects, with little aggregate 
impact on economic development. 
While poverty has decreased since the start of the war, mainly due to 
remittances from Nepali workers abroad, recent studies show that it 
is still widespread. For example, in 2006, the Human Poverty Index for 
Nepal was still 35.4, which means that on average this percentage of 
the population was deprived on the three basic dimensions of health, 
education and a decent standard of living (UNDP 2009). Based on the 
US$ 2 per person per day international poverty line, about two-thirds of 
the Nepali population were still poor in 2005.
Economic inequality is also on the rise—a trend related to the spread of 
economic liberalisation. For example, the Gini coefficient of expenditures 
was 0.31 during the 1980s, 0.43 during the 1990s and 0.47 during 2000-
03 (Wagle 2007). This represents the highest level of such inequality 
in South Asia. The ratio of the consumption of the richest fifth of the 
population to that of the poorest fifth increased from 4.3 during the 
Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), signed in November 
2006 between the major political parties and the Unified Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist), declared the formal end to the 10-year civil war 
in Nepal. One of its most significant promises was political and socio-
economic transformation, which, if achieved, would mean a dramatic 
reduction in inequality and exclusion, and genuine progress on 
development. But in the current state of political and economic crisis, 
millions of Nepalis have yet to experience any tangible benefits from 
the peace process.
Mass movement
The peace accord was a response to a mass movement, the April 2006 
jana andolan, which brought over a million people onto the streets 
demanding the restoration of democracy and an end to direct rule by 
the King. The King ultimately ceded to these demands. Just over two 
years later, in August 2008, the newly elected Constituent Assembly 
voted to abolish the 240-year-old monarchy. This was a momentous 
step forward for the country because it helped weaken cultural and 
linguistic domination, which has been exercised for centuries by upper-
caste hill people. 
The end of the monarchy and the ensuing drafting of a new 
constitution by the Constituent Assembly have inevitably brought 
issues of ethnicity and representation to the fore. Economic exclusion 
has also been brought into sharper relief. The mass movement 
that helped bring down the monarchy was as much a reflection of 
discontent over the lack of economic progress—and the associated 
hope for a “new Nepal” based on greater economic equality—as it was 
about reinstating a democratic framework. Expectations for change 
were high amongst poorer Nepalis, who believed that the Maoists could 
deliver this kind of change.
Unquestionably, Nepal’s many and varied ethnic groups must have the 
right to speak their languages and practice their cultures free from fear 
or domination. Nepal has 103 caste and ethnic groups that speak some 
92 languages (UNDP 2009). One of the reasons that the Maoists won an 
overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly elections was that 
they raised the issue of ethnic rights more concretely than any other 
political party. They were able to capture genuine resentment over 
long-standing and deep-seated discrimination suffered by minorities. 
However, while the rhetoric that began the Maoist ‘People’s War’ 
focused on Nepal’s lack of economic development, the Maoists’ recent 
highlighting of ethnicity could be a reflection, unfortunately, of their 
inability or unwillingness to continue leading on questions of economic 
inclusion, particularly since the signing of the peace accord. The 40-
point declaration of demands issued by the Maoists to the government 
in 1996 had, in fact, underscored poverty, unemployment and the 
growing gap between rich and poor as justifications for taking up arms. 
But their subsequent focus on ethnic inclusion appears to have come at 
the expense of a continuing emphasis on economic equity and an end 
to poverty.
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1980s to 7.6 during the 1990s to 9.1 during 2000-03—the highest level, 
by far, for South Asia (see Table).
As a result, workplace strikes demanding better wages and conditions 
are on the rise. Because of persistent unemployment, Nepali workers 
are obliged to seek employment abroad. The mass discontent that was 
mobilised by the Maoists during the war still exists, as the regions and 
areas most deprived in the past remain sorely deprived today. 
Ethnic federalism
Some analysts have suggested that a federalist structure based 
on ethnicity would risk propelling the country towards ethnic 
fragmentation. But the possibility that ethnic demands would 
precipitate new conflicts is substantially intensified by the widespread 
failure of Nepali politicians and donors to address fundamental 
economic demands. It is important to recognise that while the issue of 
economic inclusion has galvanized the poor in Nepal, a focus on ethnic 
rights has the potential to encourage ethnic competition, including 
amongst the poor. 
Those arguing for some form of federalism on the basis of ethnicity have 
not been clear about how the rights of the poor would be guaranteed, 
especially since the elite from an ethnic group within an autonomous 
state would still likely be able to maintain exclusive access to economic 
resources. Also, if an ethnic group is a minority within a state in which an 
ethnic majority is particularly assertive, there is no guarantee against  
renewed ethnic domination.
Such a problem has not gone unnoticed, for example, by the dalits, 
who are spread out across the country. Most dalits argue for a form of 
affirmative action but have expressed dissatisfaction with the current 
proposals for a federal structure. 
A striking example of rising ethnic tensions is found in the Tarai, which 
constitutes the southern plains bordering India. The Madhesis, who 
inhabit much of the Tarai and constitute a third of Nepal’s population, 
launched their own ethnic movement in early 2007, reflecting their 
anger about decades of discrimination by the central state. 
Since then, violence in the region has been on the rise: between 
Madhesi armed groups and the Maoists, and between Madhesis 
and hill people, many of whom have left their homes out of fear for 
their security. Moreover, in the western Tarai, Tharus and other ethnic 
groups have warned of reprisals if the land they inhabit is not declared 
autonomous. The bulk of this movement is in direct opposition to the 
formation of a single Madhes state, which has been proposed by the 
Madhesis. 
The changed political landscape of Nepal must now be translated into 
equal rights for all Nepalis, and, in particular, for ethnic minorities. But 
unless the focus shifts towards achieving genuine economic progress 
and economic inclusion during this transition period—instead of 
focusing on ethnic inclusion—there is little chance that the current 
peace process and the drafting of a new constitution will succeed in 
establishing a stable and democratic Nepal. 
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Nepal’s Rising Economic Inequality
Years
Gini coefficient 
of expenditures
Ratio of the consumption of 
the  top to the bottom quintile
1980s 0.31 4.3
1990s 0.43 7.6
2000-03 0.47 9.1
Source:  Wagle, 2007
